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As institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most listed UK firms, one expects them to monitor the 
firms they invest in. However, there is mounting empirical evidence which suggests that they do not perform any 
monitoring. This paper provides a new test on whether UK institutional investors engage in monitoring. The test 
consists of an event study on directors’ trades. If institutional shareholders act as monitors, their monitoring 
activities convey new information about a firm’s future value to other outside shareholders and reduce the 
informational asymmetry between the managers and the market. As a result, directors’ trades convey less 
information to the market, and the stock price reaction is weaker. However, our results show that institutional 
shareholders do not have any significant impact on the stock price reaction which stands in marked contrast with 
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There is now a wealth of empirical studies which show that control of listed UK firms is very 
different from that of Continental European firms. The European Corporate Governance 
Network (ECGN), the precursor of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 
undertook a project analysing the control of 8 Continental European countries
1
, the UK and 
the US. The results, which where published in Barca and Becht (2001), show that most listed 
UK and US firms are widely held whereas the vast majority of Continental European firms 
have a large dominant shareholder. Also, the types of shareholders that predominate are 
different. In most of Continental Europe, family control as well as control by other firms is 
important. In contrast, in the UK, institutional shareholders are the most common type of 
large shareholder, followed by directors who own large minority stakes in most quoted firms. 
The Japanese and German corporate governance systems have now somewhat fallen into 
disrepute with the advent of shareholder protection and the weak economic performance of 
both countries over the past 15 years. However, in the past, one of the major comparative 
advantages of these systems was thought to be the monitoring of firms by banks. Although the 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such monitoring is not entirely conclusive, there 
are several papers which suggest that banks have a positive impact on firm performance as 
well as dividend policy. For example, Cable (1985) reports that firms with bank control 
perform better than those without. There is also evidence that when the large universal banks 
provide most of the debt financing to listed German firms the firms’ total factor productivity 
increases. The beneficial influence of these universal banks is especially apparent in the wake 
of poor performance (Köke and Renneboog 2005). Further, Goergen et al. (2005) find that 
firms controlled by banks benefit from more flexibility in terms of their dividend policy, as 
the need for costly dividend signalling is less pronounced.  
Conversely, one of the main shortcomings of the UK system is thought to be passiveness of 
institutional investors and the resulting high discretionary power of directors. Although 
institutional shareholders control a large proportion of votes, they are often reported to abstain 
from voting in AGMs or rubber-stamp the management’s motions (see e.g. Goergen and 
Renneboog 2001). As a result, managers are left with substantial levels of discretion as to how 
they run the firm. Recent outcries in the popular press about the levels of managerial 
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compensation and payments for bad-performance (so called golden handshakes) have called 
for a more substantial involvement of institutional investors in companies’ affairs. 
However, tests on the degree of involvement of institutional investors in the firms they invest 
in are notoriously difficult to conduct for at least two reasons. First, institutional investors 
may act behind the scenes rather than vote at the AGM. This would make their involvement 
virtually invisible to outsiders. Second, ownership and control patterns in general, and 
institutional ownership and control in particular, may be endogenous to firm performance. 
This is an issue central to studies which analyse the impact of ownership and control on firm 
performance.  
The aim of this paper is to perform a new test of whether UK institutional investors engage in 
monitoring or not. The test consists of an event study on directors’ trades. If institutional 
shareholders are monitors, their presence as major shareholders should convey value-relevant 
information to other outside shareholders and reduce the informational asymmetry between 
the managers and all the shareholders. Directors’ dealings should then have lower 
informational value and this should in turn be reflected in a weaker market reaction.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 compares the ownership and 
control of UK firms to that of Continental European firms. It also reviews the literature on 
monitoring by institutional investors and the other main types of shareholders in the UK. 
Section 3 reviews the literature on insider trading and presents a brief overview of the UK 
regulation on directors’ dealings. The following section formulates the conjectures which are 
then tested in Section 5 and discusses the data sources and methodology employed in the 
event study. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Ownership, Control and Monitoring by Institutional Shareholders 
One of the main differences between the UK on one side, and Continental Europe and Japan 
on the other side, is the much higher dispersion of ownership in the UK. Figure 1 shows that 
in Continental Europe a majority of firms have a shareholder owning at least a blocking 
minority of the votes, i.e. 25%. The UK and USA are exceptional in the sense that they have 
the opposite pattern with the vast majority of their listed firms being widely held.  
The UK also differs from Continental Europe in terms of the relative importance of the largest 
shareholder. Table I shows that, on average, the largest shareholder has virtually uncontested 
control over the firm given the small stake held by the second largest shareholder. In contrast, 





shareholder. Further, table II shows that, in Continental Europe, families, other firms, and the 
government dominate whereas, in the UK, it is institutional investors (mainly insurance 
companies and investment funds) followed by directors.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLES I AND II ABOUT HERE] 
Although institutional investors are the largest owners of UK listed firms, they have been 
accused by the Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998) and Newbold (2001) corporate governance 
committees of being too passive investors. In a review of institutional investments in the UK, 
Myners (2001) points out that UK institutional investors are ‘unnecessarily reluctant’ to take 
an activist stance in relation to corporate underperformance. Stapledon (1996), Goergen and 
Renneboog (2001), and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) argue that institutional investors do not 
normally intervene for two reasons. First, they lack the monitoring expertise. Second, they 
may want to maintain the liquidity of their investments as insider-trading regulation prevents 
monitors from rebalancing their portfolios. In contrast, recent anecdotal evidence suggests 
that, even though institutional shareholders do not publicly intervene, they do act behind the 
scenes. Moreover, surveys on the actual voting behaviour of investment funds reveal that vote 
casting by institutions has been improving rapidly. Some institutions have established voting 
policies committing themselves to cast their votes on e.g. major investment decisions in their 
investees (for examples, see Mallin 1999), and have recently begun to set even agendas for 
shareholder activism (Mallin et al. 2005).  
The empirical evidence seems to be virtually unanimous in agreeing on an absence of 
monitoring by institutional investors in the UK.
2
 Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) 
investigate whether the presence of blockholders in poorly performing UK companies is 
related to increased board restructuring. They find no such evidence. The only consistent 
relation they find is a significantly negative link between managerial ownership and executive 
board turnover. They interpret this finding as clear evidence of managerial entrenchment: 
managers with a substantial degree of control are able to ward off successfully any attempts to 
remove them. Crespi and Renneboog (2002) analyse whether voting coalitions are formed by 
shareholders in order to take corporate governance actions such as the disciplining of the 
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 In contrast, there is a sizeable body of literature which suggests that German banks which own large minority 
stakes in otherwise widely held firms perform monitoring tasks and that this monitoring is not a recent 
phenomenon (see, e.g., Cable 1985, Gorton and Schmid 2000, Correia et al. 2004 and Goergen et al. 2005). 
However, empirical studies fail to find evidence of a consistent, positive impact of German banks on firm 
performance (Chirinko and Elston 1996, 2000) and on board turnover in poorly performing companies (Franks 






incumbent management. They use Shapley values to capture the relative power of shareholder 
coalitions by category of owner (e.g. institutional investors). They show evidence of 
successful resistance by executive directors against board restructuring in cases where the 
executive directors as a group can combine their ownership stakes to form a substantial block 
of voting power. However, investment trusts, pension funds and funds managed by banks do 
not seem to play a role in the management replacement process.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2001) investigate whether investment spending by UK firms is 
sensitive to the availability of internal funds. In particular, the authors analyse whether the 
relationship between corporate investment and free cash flow depends on the control structure 
of the firms (and hence the relative importance of institutional investors). Control is expected 
to influence the relation between investment and financing for two reasons. First, due to 
asymmetric information, the existence of a link between liquidity and investment may cause 
underinvestment. Firms may turn down some projects with otherwise positive net present 
values because of the inflated cost of external funds. Second, from an agency perspective, the 
management may not perceive external funds to be too expensive but may perceive internal 
funds (free cash flow) to be too inexpensive. Goergen and Renneboog’s research shows that, 
when industrial companies own large shareholdings, there is evidence of a relationship 
between cash flows and investment in their investee companies. This relation is strong when 
the relative voting power (measured by the Shapley values) of the combined equity stakes of 
industrial companies and the Herfindahl index of industrial ownership are high. This suggests 
that a coalition of industrial companies causes excessive investment spending.
3
 In contrast, 
large institutional holdings reduce the positive link between investment spending and cash 
flow and hence mitigate the underinvestment problem. This paper is one of the few studies 
based on large data sets suggesting that the presence of institutional shareholders does matter 
and leads to increased (investment) efficiency. 
To summarize, the literature suggests that UK institutional investors are mostly passive 
shareholders. 
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 Related literature on the corporate governance role of French holding companies, which constitute the 
dominant shareholder category in France, suggests that the presence of financial and industrial holding 
companies as major shareholders reduces corporate performance (Banerjee, Leleux and Vermaelen 1997). In 
Belgium, firms whose ultimate blockholder is a holding company do not experience increased executive board 
turnover, whereas firms whose ultimate blockholder is an industrial or commercial company experience board 





3. Insider Trading 
Under asymmetric information, insiders, that is managers and members of the board of 
directors, of publicly traded corporations hold more information about their company than 
small, outside shareholders. The informational advantage of insiders and its exploitation via 
insider trading raises the question as to the fairness and efficiency of financial markets. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) highlight the importance of this question. Based on a data set 
covering all the companies traded on the Amex, NYSE, and Nasdaq over the period of 1975-
95, they report that insider trading is frequent as it occurs in more than 50% of the stocks in 
each year. On average, insider purchases (sales) per year amount to 0.6% (1.3%) of a 
company’s market capitalization. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that the insider trades are 
largely ignored by the market upon announcement, but that insiders are able to make 
significantly positive returns over the long term. The major argument in favour of permitting 
insider trading is that it is believed to convey new information on the firm to the market. 
Consequently, given that share prices incorporate better information, shareholders require 
lower returns and bear less risk. Similarly, Leland’s (1992) model predicts that allowing 
insider trading results in higher share prices on average due to the improved informational 
efficiency and reduced risk.  
Although an insider purchase conveys straightforward, positive information about the firm’s 
prospects, the information conveyed by an insider sale is less evident. Indeed, an insider sale 
may be less informative given that the reason behind the sale may be a need for liquidity 
rather than the insider’s belief that the firm’s future value will be lower than what the market 
anticipates. Also, an insider may sell shares because of the exercise of stock options. Such 
option-related sales of shares may contain little or no information about the firm’s future 
value as they tend to form part of the insider’s remuneration package.  
A vast body of empirical literature confirms the above predictions as to the market reaction to 
insider purchases and sales. Seyhun (1986), Lin and Howe (1990), and Chang and Suk (1998) 
report positive abnormal returns on insider purchases for the case of the USA. King and Röell 
(1988), Pope et al. (1990), Gregory et al. (1994), and Gregory et al. (1997) confirm the 
existence of positive abnormal returns for the UK over horizons of 6 to 12 months following 
directors’ purchases. More recent studies by Friederich et al. (2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
corroborate the findings of the previous studies for UK companies over the short term. They 





In the UK, the 1977 Model Code of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the 1985 
Companies Act regulate insider trading. According to the Misuse of Information Act, insider 
information is information that is new, material, and not known by the market. The Criminal 
Justice Act makes trading on insider information – i.e. information not regularly available and 
obtained through insiders – a legal offence subject to prosecution. The Financial Services and 
Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000, which became effective as of 1 December 2001, further refines 
the definition of illegal insider trading
4
 and specifies a dual prosecution track that facilitates 
the procedures to bring insider trading violations to court. Lack of disclosure, violation of 
trading bans, and misuse of inside information can be prosecuted under the Misuse of 
Information Act using either a civil law or a criminal law procedure.
5
 Our paper does not deal 
with illegal trading on insider information, but focuses on directors’ dealings, the legal trading 
by directors of the company as defined in the Listing Rules of UK Listing Authority, a 
division of the Financial Services Authority.  
A trading ban of two months prior to a preliminary, final or interim earnings announcement 
and one month prior to a quarterly earnings announcement applies to companies trading on 
the LSE. Directors still require clearance to trade from the chairman of the board of directors 
outside these trading bans.
6
 The UK Model Code requires the members of the board of 
directors to inform their company as soon as possible after a transaction and no later than the 
fifth business day after the transaction has been carried out for their personal account or on 
behalf of their spouses and children (Friederich et al. (2002)). The company is then required 
to inform the LSE of the transaction without delay and no later than the end of the business 
day following receipt of the information by the company. The LSE disseminates this 
information immediately to data vendors as well as via its own news service, the Regulatory 
News Service (RNS). The company is also required to enter this information in its company 
register, which is available for public inspection, within three days after the transaction has 
been reporting by the director.  
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 “Any person who does act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression 
as to the market in or the price or value of any relevant investments is guilty of an offence if he does so for the 
purpose of creating that impression and of thereby inducing another person to acquire, dispose of, subscribe for 
or underwrite those investments or to refrain from doing so or to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights 
conferred by those investments” (FSMA 2000, s.397). 
5 
In 2000, the London Stock Exchange’s authority to impose administrative penalties was transferred to the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). The LSE passes any information raising the suspicion of insider trading on 
to the FSA for further investigation. 
6
 Clearance may be given to a director to sell (but not to purchase) securities during a trading ban in exceptional 
circumstances where this is the only reasonable course of action available to the director. However, Hillier and 





4. Conjectures, Data and Methodology 
This section outlines the conjectures which will be tested in the following section. It also 
reviews the data sources and the methodology used. 
Conjectures 
We start by testing the classic conjecture that directors’ trades convey information to the stock 
market and that, consequently, the market reacts to these trades. By purchasing shares in their 
firm, directors convey a positive signal about the future value of the firm to the market. The 
signal is costly, and therefore credible to outsiders, as the directors put their own wealth at 
stake and bear the cost of holding less than optimally diversified investment portfolios. 
Conversely, directors signal negative news when selling shares. 
Conjecture 1:  
a) There is a positive market price reaction to directors’ purchases. 
b) There is a negative market price reaction to directors’ sales. 
Next, we distinguish between two types of outside shareholders: institutional investors, and 
other shareholders (mainly families or individuals not related to the firm’s directors and other 
firms).
7
 If institutional investors monitor the firms they invest in, their monitoring activities 
will be at least partially visible to other outside shareholders
8
 who consequently have more 
information on the firms’ future value
9
 and benefit from less asymmetric information and a 
better alignment of their interests with those of the management. Given the lower 
informational asymmetry, directors’ trades are a less important signal to outside shareholders 
and contain less informational value. Such firms will then experience a less substantial market 
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 There are only a few companies controlled by the government or the directors. 
8
 For example, the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee, the association of the four major institutional 
shareholder associations in the UK, states “[m]onitoring (by institutional investors) may require sharing 
information with other shareholders or agents and agreeing a common course of action” (Statement of Principles, 
September 2005, page 2). In addition, in a case study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, Becht et al. (2006) report 
that in more than 80% of its monitoring and activism cases the Fund contacted other institutional shareholders to 
communicate its engagement objectives and to solicit support for its activities. 
9
 It is important to note that the new information that monitoring activities generate is usually not insider 
information about the firm. Processing insider information would preclude institutional investors from 
rebalancing their portfolios and lock in their investments (Goergen and Renneboog 2001). The Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee states that “institutional shareholders and/or agents may not wish to be made insiders 
(by monitoring). Institutional shareholders and/or agents will expect investee companies and their advisers to 
ensure that information that could affect their ability to deal in the shares of the company concerned is not 
conveyed to them without their agreement” (Statement of Principles, September 2005, page 3). Furthermore, 







reaction to directors’ trades. To summarize, the presence of monitoring shareholders is 
expected to reduce the magnitude of the share price reaction to directors’ dealings. Given the 
empirical and anecdotal evidence, we expect UK institutional investors to be passive and not 
to influence the share price reaction to directors’ trades, whereas we expect other shareholders 
(families or individuals not related to the directors and other firms) to monitor the firms they 
invest in and reduce the share price reaction. 
Conjecture 2:  
a) Families or individuals not related to the directors and other firms will reduce the 
positive share price reaction to directors’ purchases. 
b) Families or individuals not related to the directors and other firms will reduce the 
negative share price reaction to directors’ sales. 
Conjecture 3: 
a) Institutional investors will not influence the positive share price reaction to 
directors’ purchases. 
b) Institutional investors will not influence the negative share price reaction to 
directors’ sales. 
Data and methodology  
The data on directors’ dealings are for the second half of the 1990s and are sourced from the 
Regulatory News Service. We aggregate multiple purchases (or sales) by the same director on 
a given day (e.g. we consider one purchase of 2,000 shares and another one of 5,000 shares to 
be equivalent to a single purchase of 7,000 shares). We also net purchase and sale transactions 
made by the same director on the same day (e.g. a purchase of 4,000 shares and a sale of 
12,000 shares constitute a net sale of 8,000 shares). As the market is not likely to react to very 
small share transactions, we concentrate on (net) transactions accounting for at least 0.1% of a 
firm’s market capitalisation. We are left with 1,094 purchases and 1,087 sales. Company 
name changes during the period of study, the annual numbers of shares outstanding and the 
industry codes for the firms were obtained from the London Share Price Database (LSPD). 
Information on ownership was sourced from Worldscope which records all direct ownership 
stakes of 5% or more. We distinguish between stakes held by the directors, other firms, 
institutional investors, and individuals or families not related to the directors. Finally, share 

















R   (1) 
where i and t relate to firm i and day t, respectively, P and D are the daily price and the 
dividend (if any) from Datastream and N is the number of new shares for each old share in 
case of a stock split. The abnormal return ARi,t for firm i on day t is based on the market 
model and is calculated for each day within the period starting with the 20
th
 day prior to and 
finishing with the 20
th
 day after the event day (day 0). It is defined as follows:  
( )
tmiititi RRAR ,,,
ˆˆ βα +−=  for 20,...,20−=t , (2) 
where Ri,t is the return on firm i on day t as defined in equation (1), and Rm,t is the market 
return on day t proxied by the FTSE All Share index excluding investment trusts. The 
parameters iα̂  and iβ̂  are obtained by regressing Ri,t on Rm,t over the period of 200 to 21 days 
before the event day. We also checked whether our results are robust to the correction of the 
small-firm size effect and alternative specifications for the benchmark model underlying the 
calculation of the abnormal returns (such as the market-adjusted model). Although the results 
based on these robustness checks are not reported in the paper, we can safely say that they 
confirm the results reported in the following section. 
The abnormal returns for individual firms are then summed up over different time windows to 
form the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Finally, the average CAR (ACAR) is the cross-
sectional average of the CAR for a given window. 
5. Results 
Figure 2 and table III for purchases and figure 3 and table IV for sales show the results from 
the event study. Figure 2 shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for all purchases, for 
purchases in firms whose largest shareholder is a family or other firm, and for purchases in 
firms whose largest shareholder is an institutional investor, respectively. The average CAR 
for all purchases over the window starting 20 days before the event day, day 0, and ending 20 
days thereafter is 5.11%. Panel A of table III shows that the average CAR for all purchases is 
positive and significantly different from zero for all the event windows starting with the event 
day. This confirms conjecture 1 a) that directors’ purchases cause positive stock price 
reactions. Another interesting observation relates to the timing of purchases. Figure 2 as well 





negative) suggest that directors successfully time their purchases to follow a period of 
declining share prices. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AND TABLE III ABOUT HERE] 
For the case of sales, figure 3 and panel A of table IV strongly corroborate conjecture 1 b): 
sales are accompanied by a negative market reaction as the average CAR drops from 3.5% on 
the event day to about 1.5% 20 days later. Although the CAR is still positive over the entire 
window starting from day –20 to +20, it has dropped substantially after the event day. The 
CAR earned over the window ranging from day 0 to day 21 is negative with –1.85% and 
highly significant. Hence, if CARs are measured from the event day onwards, they turn out to 
be significantly negative. This provides support for conjecture 1 b) about the negative market 
reaction to directors’ sales. Similar to purchases, directors seem to time their sales so that they 
follow a period of increases in share prices (the pre-event CAR over the window from day –
21 to day –1 is positive with 3.44% and highly significant). Comparing figure 2 and panel A 
of table III to figure 3 and panel A of table IV shows that the absolute value of the market 
reaction to sales (for the window ranging from day 0 to day 21) is lower than the market 
reaction to purchases. As previously discussed, this may be due to the fact that company 
directors do not only sell their shares if they hold bad news about the firm’s prospects, but 
also sell for other reasons such as liquidity needs and the exercise of options forming their 
remuneration package (Lakonishok and Lee 2001, and Friederich et al. 2002). As a result, the 
informational signal conveyed by a sale is more opaque than that conveyed by a purchase.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AND TABLE IV ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 and panel B of table III report the average CARs for purchases with firms whose 
largest shareholder is a family or other firm. Similar to all purchases, the CARs for firms 
controlled by families or other firms are positive. However, the CAR for the window ranging 
from the event day to day 21 is lower for the firms controlled by families, individuals or other 
companies: the CAR amounts to only about 6% (panel B) as compared to 7.5% for directors’ 
purchases for the firms which are not controlled by these types of shareholders (panel C). The 
difference in CARs is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that purchases by 
directors are significantly less informative in firms controlled by families, individuals or 
companies and that the monitoring by these types of shareholders reduces the informational 
asymmetry between the management and the market. Consequently, we cannot reject 





If one compares the CARs in Figure 3 on share sales in firms with dominant ownership by 
families, individuals or other firms with those on sales in all firms, one can clearly see that the 
negative share price reaction starting with day 0, the event day, is much less pronounced when 
there is ownership by families or other firms. Further, panels B and C of table IV show that 
the CAR for the window ranging from the event day to day 21 is much less negative for the 
firms controlled by families, individuals or other companies (about –1%) than those which are 
not controlled by these types of shareholders (–2%), where the difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result provides support for conjecture 2 b) which states that 
the negative price reaction is less severe in the presence of a monitoring shareholder.  
Figure 2 shows that, for the case of purchases, ownership by institutional shareholders seems 
to make little difference as the average CAR is virtually identical to that for all purchases. 
Comparing panels D and E of table III shows that the CAR (0,21) for the firms controlled by 
institutional shareholders (6.9%) is statistically indifferent from that for the firms which are 
not controlled by institutional shareholders (7.3%). Hence, the presence of institutional 
investors does not seem to mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information in their 
investee companies. Therefore, we cannot falsify conjecture 3 a). Figure 3 shows that, for the 
period starting with the event day and ending with day 20, the average CAR for directors’ 
sales in firms with institutional ownership is very similar to that for all the sales. Similar to 
the evidence obtained from the purchases, institutional investors do not seem to have a 
significant impact on the market reaction to directors’ sales. The CARs in panels D and E of 
table IV confirm this pattern: the CAR (0,21) for the firms controlled by institutional 
shareholders (–1.7%) is not statistically different from that for the firms which are not 
controlled by this type of investor (–2%). Hence, we cannot reject conjecture 3 b). However, 
it is interesting to note that the presence of institutional investors has a small economic 
impact, albeit not statistically significant, on the market reaction to directors’ trades.  
To summarise, our results suggest that institutional shareholders do not mitigate problems 
caused by asymmetric information and/or agency as they do not have an impact on the 
informational content of directors’ dealings. In contrast, we find evidence that other types of 
shareholders, mainly families and other companies, reduce the informational content of these 
trades. This suggests that these latter types of shareholders engage in monitoring the 
management of the firms they invest in and thereby reduce the informational asymmetry 






Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that institutional shareholders refrain from 
monitoring the firms in their portfolios and prefer to follow passive investment strategies. 
However, corporate governance actions by institutional investors – as well as other large 
shareholders – may be difficult to trace. For example, it may be in the interest of the large 
shareholders not to vote against any directors’ motion they oppose at the AGM. If they do so, 
then this may cause a drop in the firm’s share price which in turn reflects badly on the 
performance of their investment portfolio. Hence, they may prefer to act behind the scenes 
and avoid that such motions make it to the AGM in the first place. The aim of this paper was 
to test whether UK institutional shareholders directly or indirectly monitor the management of 
their investee firms. 
We test whether institutional shareholders engage in monitoring by conducting an event study 
on directors’ transactions in the shares of their own firm. If institutional investors are efficient 
monitors, then their monitoring activities will convey new information about the firm’s future 
value to other outside shareholders and reduce the informational content of directors’ trades. 
More specifically, their presence will decrease in absolute value the negative cumulative 
abnormal returns triggered by directors’ sales as well as the positive effect of directors’ 
purchases. In contrast, if institutional investors do not monitor, the share price reactions 
should not be different from those for firms without institutional investors. Furthermore, if 
institutional investors do not monitor, but rather follow the insiders’ trades, the share price 
reactions will be stronger (in absolute terms). 
Our main findings are as follows. First, similar to existing UK and US studies, we find that 
directors’ trades are informative as they cause share price reactions. Second, we report that 
institutional shareholders do not have a significant impact on the market reaction to purchases 
and sales. Third, other types of shareholders, mainly families and other firms reduce the 
market reaction to both directors’ purchases and sales. This suggests that these latter types of 
shareholders, to the opposite of institutional investors, engage in monitoring and thereby 
decrease the informational value of directors’ dealings. 
However, recent developments in corporate governance in the UK (such as the Myners (2001) 
report) have put pressure on institutional investors to become more active. For example, the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (2002) issued a statement on the responsibilities of 





to set clear agendas for shareholder activism (Mallin et al. 2005). This suggests an interesting 
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Table I: Average largest stakes held in 
European, UK and US firms 
 
The table reports the average largest and second largest control 
stake. For all countries, the data are for 1996, except for 
Belgium (1994) and the UK (1993). The sample companies in 
all countries are listed, except for Austria where the sample 
consists of both listed and unlisted companies. 
   Stakes 
 Sample Note Largest 2
nd
 largest 
     
Austria 600 (1) 82.2 9.5 
France 403 (1) 56.0 16.0 
Italy 214 (1) 52.3 7.7 
Netherlands 137 (2) 28.2 9.2 
Spain 394 (1) 38.3i 11.5 
UK 248 (2) 14.0 8.3 
US–NYSE 1,309 (2) 8.5          3.7    
US–NASDAQ 2,831 (2) 13.0 5.7 
     






Belgium 135 (1) 55.8 6.9 
Germany 402 (1) 59.7 8.6 
     
Notes (1): based on both direct and indirect shareholdings; (2): 
based on direct shareholdings only. Source: based on research by 






Table II: Distribution of largest shareholders in Europe. 
          
This table reports the sum of shareholdings of at least 5% held by different shareholder types. For all the countries the data 
are for 1996, except for Belgium (1994) and the UK (1993).  
          







 Sample Notes        
Austria 600 (2) 38.6 5.6 0.0 0.0 33.9 11.7 0.0 
Belgium 155 (2) 15.6 0.4 1.0 3.8 37.5 0.3 0.0 
France 402 (2) 15.5 16.0 3.5 0.0 34.5 1.0 0.0 
Germany 402 (2) 7.4 1.2 0.2 0.0 21.0 0.7 0.0 
Italy  – (1), (2), (4) 68.6 7.2 0.0 0.0 24.2 0 0.0 
Netherlands 137 (3) 10.8 7.2 2.4 16.1 10.9 1.3 0.0 
Spain 394 (2) 21.8 6.6 8.8 0.0 32.6 0.0 0.0 
UK  248 (3) 2.4 1.1 4.7 11.0 5.9 0.0 11.3 
 
Notes (1): The Italian sample includes both listed and unlisted companies whereas all other country samples contain only 
listed firms; (2): covers both direct and indirect shareholdings; (3): covers only direct shareholdings; (4) most of the Italian 
firms classed as firms owned by other firms are ultimately owned by the government. 
 






Table III: Average cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ purchases 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns for all directors’ purchases (1094 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 5.11% -1.98% 7.10% 2.63% 3.69% 4.15% 
t(ACAR) 6.75 -3.47 14.10 10.30 12.30 12.40 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ purchases in firms controlled by families or 
other firms (302 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 4.19% -1.81% 6.00% 2.45% 3.32% 3.88% 
t(ACAR) 3.05 -1.81 6.69 5.63 6.36 6.13 
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ purchases for firms Not controlled by families 
or other firms (792 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 5.46% -2.04% 7.52% 2.70% 3.83% 4.25% 
t(ACAR) 6.45 -3.29 13.13 10.35 12.39 11.72 
Panel D: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ purchases for firms controlled by institutional 
investors (544 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 4.73% -2.18% 6.91% 2.65% 3.45% 4.06% 
t(ACAR) 4.63 -2.91 10.00 8.42 9.25 9.27 
Panel E: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ purchases for firms Not controlled by 
institutional investors (550 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 5.49% -1.78% 7.29% 2.61% 3.93% 4.24% 
t(ACAR) 5.39 -2.21 10.26 7.25 9.28 8.98 
Note: The ACAR is the cross-sectional average cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CARs are based on the market 
model. The t(ACAR) is Barber and Lyon’s (1997) test statistic. It is Student-t distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom and 







Table IV: Average cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ sales 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns for all directors’ sales (1087 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 1.59% 3.44% -1.85% -0.37% -0.45% -0.62% 
t(ACAR) 2.57 6.96 -5.70 -3.38 -3.18 -3.51 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ sales in firms controlled by families or other 
firms (182 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 4.68% 5.70% -1.02% -0.75% -0.63% -0.86% 
t(ACAR) 2.22 3.23 -1.21 -2.59 -1.70 -1.96 
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ sales in firms Not controlled by families or other 
firms (905 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 0.97% 2.99% -2.02% -0.29% -0.41% -0.57% 
t(ACAR) 1.90 8.31 -6.05 -2.51 -3.14 -3.58 
Panel D: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ sales for firms controlled by institutional 
investors (462 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 0.97% 2.66% -1.69% -0.41% -0.59% -0.75% 
t(ACAR) 1.36 5.29 -3.62 -2.50 -3.20 -3.36 
Panel E: Cumulative abnormal returns for directors’ sales for firms Not controlled by institutional 
investors (625 observations) 
Window (-20,20) (-20,-1) (0,21) (0,1) (0,3) (0,5) 
ACAR 2.05% 4.02% -1.97% -0.34% -0.35% -0.52% 
t(ACAR) 2.51 6.16 -4.60 -2.36 -1.86 -2.25 
Note: The ACAR is the cross-sectional average cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CARs are based on the market 
model. The t(ACAR) is Barber and Lyon’s (1997) test statistic. It is Student-t distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom and 






Source: based on research by the European Corporate Governance Institute  
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